Friday, 27 January 2017

How Brexit Britain could become a nuclear rogue state

 Letter sent to the Guardian:

Your energy correspondent’s important report (“UK exit from EU atomic treaty under Brexit 'will delay power stations,' Guardian, 27 January; rightly raises an aspect of Brexit  that has eluded the political discussion of Brexit complexities to date

You report an anonymous government spokeswoman as asserting that  the UK wanted to see a continuity of cooperation and standards. “We remain absolutely committed to the highest standards of nuclear safety, safeguards and support for the industry. Our aim is clear – we want to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear cooperation with the EU.”

But nuclear technology consultant John Large is more accurate in pointing out  “The main burden of the UK leaving Euratom will be the need for it to cover its nuclear non-proliferation safeguards commitment and for this it will have to either set up a separate, independent agency or bring these treaty responsibilities into the Office for Nuclear Regulation.”

Indeed, this issue was raised by Green Party co-leader, Caroline Lucas MP in a written question shortly after the Brexit referendum, when she asked the business and energy secretary “what steps would be needed to replace EU Atomic Energy Community safeguards inspectors with International Atomic Energy Agency Inspectors to implement safeguards provisions on (a) UK nuclear installations and (b) nuclear material used and created at UK nuclear sites under treaties to which the UK is a party?” (Hansard, 3 August 2016) 

She was told by energy minister, Jesse Norman, who  responded with following evasive reply: “Until the UK leaves the EU, it is expected to remain a full member with all relevant rights and obligations. The Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy will continue to work closely with stakeholders and the rest of Government during our negotiations to exit the EU to deliver energy which is secure, affordable and clean.” 

What Mr Norman did not address is the fact that currently international inspection of UK nuclear plants and nuclear explosive materials to ensure the UK pledge not to divert these plants or materials to military misuse is verified, to recall Mrs May’s phrase in Philadelphia by the EU;s Euratom agency on behalf of the UN’s International Atomic Energy  Agency (IAEA) in Vienna,  under a treaty signed in September 1978 between the UK, Euratom and the IAEA. 

As our nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation puts it “The UK voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA and Euratom came into force in 1978 and specifies the UKs acceptance of the application of IAEA safeguards "On all source or special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only," adding” As part of measures to strengthen the global safeguards regime, the UK has agreed an additional protocol with the IAEA and Euratom which supplements its voluntary offer safeguards agreement.(( 

This came into force in April 2004 and is implemented under the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the accompanying Nuclear Safeguards (Notifications) Regulations 2004.

It is now time energy and foreign ministers and their advisors turn their attention to what they are going to do to ensure nuclear safeguards continuity in the UK post Brexit to avoid the UK becoming a nuclear rogue state.


Tuesday, 24 January 2017

UK nuclear weapons require proper Parliamentary scrutiny

Letter to The Times:

Your first leading article (“Atomic angst”, January 24,
rightly argues  that it  has been seriously politically deleterious to Mrs May and her Defence Secretary, Sir Michael Fallon, to  be less than candid  to the public, via the television interview with Andrew Marr, and Parliament, over the Trident test failure revealed by your sister Sunday  paper.(

Sir Michael told MPs on 23 January that “We do not comment on the detail of submarine operations;” and added that “Let me just be very, very clear: neither I nor the Prime Minister are going to give operational details of our submarine operations or of the systems and sub-systems that are tested through a demonstration and shakedown (DESO) operation.”(
This assertion is demonstrably untrue, as your news report establishes (“Fallon attacked over Trident secrecy," January 24; In November  2012, the then defence minister, Philip Dunne,  provided details in a written reply  to Green Party MP, Caroline Lucas (19 November  2012, Hansard, Column 239W) of a DESO in the Atlantic ocean on 23 October 2012.
Mr Dunne also revealed  in second  reply to Mrs Lucas  that as “the UK is a signatory to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation” it is “ is obliged to inform the 133 other signatories of ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights.”
Surely it is unacceptable to Parliament  that 133 other states were informed of the Trident test conducted in June 2016  but information was withheld from MPs and peers?
Parliament  has just been awarded  re-inforced sovereignty over the Brexit process by the Supreme Court decision. It now needs to re-establish a similar power of scrutiny over the UK’s nuclear weapons programme.

Monday, 23 January 2017

Nuclear Accidents will happen

Letter sent to the Daily Mail:

Admiral Lord West, Labour’s former Security Minister at the MOD, is far too complacent  in his assertion, without evidence, (Mail, 23 January) that “I am totally confident that Trident missiles work.”

The problem is things can - and do- go wrong with nuclear weapons, in manufacture, transport, and deployment, with potentially catastrophic consequences..
In a chilling essay “World War Three, by Mistake”, published in the New Yorker Magazine on 23 December 2016’(

World War Three, by Mistake Harsh political rhetoric, combined with the vulnerability of the nuclear command-and-control system, has made the risk of global ...

), the author Eric Schlosser writes chillingly  of how such disasters can occur, reporting

“On June 3, 1980, at about two-thirty in the morning, computers at the National Military Command Center, beneath the Pentagon, at the headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), deep within Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, and at Site R, the Pentagon’s alternate command post center hidden inside Raven Rock Mountain, Pennsylvania, issued an urgent warning: the Soviet Union had just launched a nuclear attack on the United States. The Soviets had recently invaded Afghanistan, and the animosity between the two superpowers was greater than at any other time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
U.S. Air Force ballistic-missile crews removed their launch keys from the safes, bomber crews ran to their planes, fighter planes took off to search the skies, and the Federal Aviation Administration prepared to order every airborne commercial airliner to land.
President Jimmy Carter’s national-security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was asleep in Washington, D.C., when the phone rang. His military aide, General William Odom, was calling to inform him that two hundred and twenty missiles launched from Soviet submarines were heading toward the United States. Brzezinski told Odom to get confirmation of the attack. A retaliatory strike would have to be ordered quickly; Washington might be destroyed within minutes. Odom called back and offered a correction: twenty-two hundred Soviet missiles had been launched.
As he prepared to call Carter and recommend an American counterattack, the phone rang for a third time. Odom apologized—it was a false alarm. An investigation later found that a defective computer chip in a communications device at NORAD headquarters had generated the erroneous warning. The chip cost forty-six cents.”
Two weeks ago, defence minister Harriet Baldwin told Green MP Caroline Lucas, who chairs the All Party group Parliamentary CND,
"The Third Tier Arrangement Tier arrangement between the UK and the US for responding to an accident in the UK involving US nuclear weapons was last updated on 27 March 2014. The most recent tabletop and field exercises conducted under the auspices of the Arrangement, Exercise DIAMOND DRAGON 2015, were held in Suffolk over the period 30 June to 2 July 2015."
(USA: Nuclear Weapons: Written question – 58420, 10 January)
The minister added: “The dates and locations of the next tabletop and field exercises are yet to be agreed.”
In light of the Trident missile test failure revealed this week, ministers need to organise some further safety test exercises urgently.

Thursday, 19 January 2017

Nuclear Sell out: how UK is helping India proliferate

Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson opined in a very pro-Brexit speech to the Raisina Dialogue - an annual conference, envisioned to be India's flagship conference of geopolitics and geo-economics-  held in India’s capital city, New Delhi, on 19 January:  “I think the time has come to stick up for free trade to make the case once again for the immense benefits of a globalised economy where we learn from each other and trade freely with each other and that case needs setting out here now and I believe I am perhaps the man to do it because I belong to a select group of people who are not always approved of by the global elites.”


Johnson added: “by the way we were the first P5 country to call for India to join the Security Council as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group.”



The Foreign Secretary seems to regard these  proposals as an unquestionably  positive good, but not all nations agree. For example, the UK’s partner on the UN Security Council Permanent 5 (P5), China, has opposed India being allowed to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a stance criticised by the outgoing Obama administration, which negatively dubbed Beijing as an "outlier" in America's efforts to bring New Delhi on board the elite nuclear trading group..


But China is advocating a two-step so-called "non-discriminatory" approach for admission of countries who have not signed nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for which the UK and US are founding members and depositary states- in the NSG. The US and France back the UK in wanting India to join the NSG.

Beijing announced last in November, it first wants to find a solution that is applicable to the admission of all non-NPT members followed by discussions to admit specific non-NPT member. China's stand for a non-discriminatory criteria is regarded significant as Pakistan, a close ally of Beijing too has applied for the NSG membership along with India.WASHINGTON: The outgoing Obama administration has lashed out at China for blocking India+ from becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group+ and has described the Communist giant as an "outlier" in America's efforts to bring New Delhi on board the elite grouping.

"Clearly there is one outlier that needs to be addressed and that is China," said
Nisha Desai Biswal, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia.

The US statement comes a week ahead of the Obama administration passing on the baton to the Trump administration+ .

Officials say it is because of the
Chinese resistance that India could not become a member of NSG, where all decisions are taken on the basis of consensus.

"The (US) President (Barack Obama) has been very clear and unequivocal that he believes that India has met the criteria for NSG and that the United States supports India's entry that India is ready and India should be brought into the NSG," she said.

"We worked very closely with India to support India's application into the NSG, but we also recognise that there continue to be some concerns, some reservations that some of the members of the NSG have expressed that need to be worked through," she said.

"We believe we have made substantial progress on that and as we hand the baton over to the next administration the path forward will be found for that. Clearly there is one outlier that needs to be addressed and that is China. As we move through all the other elements of the NSG membership, I think, we're on a good path forward," Biswal said.

So what remains is to be able to have a very clear understanding on what is the basis of China's reservations and to try to work through those. So that will be something that would move on to the next administration to carry forward, she said in response to a question.

"But this is something that the President himself has personally engaged on, the Secretary (of State), (National Security Advisor), Ambassador (Susan) Rice and down the line this has been an area of intense effort by this administration," Biswal said.

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While India not becoming a NSG member is disappointing, Biswal said the Obama administration is "very very gratified to see India's entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)".


China is advocating a two-step "non-discriminatory" approach for admission of countries who have not signed nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the NSG.

Top Comment

Waiting for Trump to do the negotiation. Let us see what all he does because everything is negotiable with China now, including the whole China and its 35 provinces(including Pak)Shubham


As per the new stand announced by Beijing in November, it first wants to find a solution that is applicable to the admission of all non-NPT members followed by discussions to admit specific non-NPT member.


China's stand for a non-discriminatory criteria is regarded significant as Pakistan, a close ally of Beijing too has applied for the NSG membership along with India.

('Outlier' China preventing India's entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group, says US, Times of India, PTI, 15 January 2017;

But the UK has gone even further, negotiating preferential deal with India on nuclear technology and science co-operation, begun under the last Labour government (“The Atomic Bizarre: Nuclear security and proliferation – key issues of concern, and followed up by the Conservative Government led by David Cameron (“Cameron backs rogue nuclear state,”

This notorious nuclear agreement was initially agree in London on 13 November 2015, and subsequently entered into force on 16 December 2016. Bu tit was only presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary in January 2017 (as Cm 9311)


Here are some edited extracts to give the flavor of the planned co-operation, which, as China has pointed out, goes against the spirit if not the absolute letter of the UK’s obligation as a (depositary) state for the1968 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which India persistently and consistently refuses to join, due to its discrimination in favour of the ​​P5 nuclear weapons states.



It worrying shows how the UK Government under the pressures of Brexit to find new global trading partners, is prepared to ride hard and fast over the previously preciously guarded international norms against nuclear proliferation.


The Treaty:

Recalling the Joint Declaration of the Parties on civil nuclear co-operation, done on

11 February 2010


Recognising that the United Kingdom is a member of the European Atomic Energy

Community ("Euratom"), and is subject to obligations under the Treaty

Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") done at

Brussels on 17 April 19571;

Noting Euratom's role in relation to the supply of nuclear material in the European


Mindful that India has concluded an “Agreement between the Government of India

and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to

Civilian Nuclear Facilities" (done at Vienna on 2 February 2009, and entered into

force on 11 May 20092), hereinafter referred to as INFCIRC/754, as supplemented

by an Additional Protocol (done at Vienna on 25 February 2009, and entered into

force on 25 July 20143);

Mindful also that the United Kingdom is subject to Euratom Treaty Safeguards and

has voluntarily entered into an “Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the

International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (done at Vienna on 6 September 19764, and entered into force on 14 August 1978), hereinafter referred to as INFCIRC/263,

as supplemented by an Additional Protocol (done at Vienna on 22 September

19985, and entered into force on 30 April 2004);

Scope of the Cooperation Agreement

1. The Parties shall cooperate in the promotion and development of peaceful

uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

2. Nothing in this Agreement will affect the rights and obligations of the Parties

in terms of their respective applicable national laws and policies as well as in terms

of their respective applicable international Agreements, Treaties and Conventions.

3. For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the

international Treaties referred to in paragraph (2) include in particular the rights

and obligations arising from its participation in the European Union and Euratom.

4. The Parties may co-operate in any of the following areas:

a) use of nuclear energy for generation of electricity and water


b) research and development, including the design and application of

nuclear energy for use in such fields as agriculture, healthcare, industry

and medicine;

c) nuclear safety, radiation aspects, and environmental protection;

d) the supply of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment,

components, technology or information;

e) nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel cycle management, including through the

development of strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any

disruption of supply over the life time of India’s nuclear reactors which

have been notified by India to the IAEA as per the provisions of


f) industrial co-operation related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy

between persons in the United Kingdom and in India;

g) technical training and education related to peaceful uses of nuclear

energy including access to and use of equipment;

h) the provision of technical assistance and services, including fuel


i) decommissioning of nuclear facilities;

j) other areas for co-operation agreed by the Parties in writing.


Nuclear Trade

1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves and those duly

authorised by them, and also where appropriate, trade between either Party and

third countries of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or

technology obligated to the other Party.



Transfers and Retransfers

1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or

technology transferred between the Parties, whether transferred directly or through

an authorised third party, as well as all successive generations of nuclear material

recovered or obtained as by-products, shall be subject to this Agreement unless

otherwise jointly decided in writing by the Parties.

2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or

technology subject to this Agreement shall not be transferred beyond the territory,

jurisdiction or control of the recipient Party without the prior written consent of the

supplier Party, except in accordance with this Article.

3. A Party shall only allow the transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear

material, equipment, components or technology subject to this Agreement to a third

State after having obtained written consent for this purpose from the other Party,

and a commitment by the recipient that such transfers shall be:

a) used for peaceful purposes only;

b) subject to IAEA safeguards; and

c) protected by adequate physical protection measures.

4. The requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall not apply to any transfers

to a Member State of the European Union of nuclear material, non-nuclear

material, equipment, components or technology, including all successive

generations of nuclear material recovered or obtained as by-products, that are

subject to the provisions of the Euratom Treaty and any relevant, related EU legal



Reprocessing and Enrichment

1. Reprocessing and any other alteration in form or content of nuclear material

transferred to India pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material, including

all successive generations of nuclear material recovered or obtained as by-products,

used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material,

equipment, components or technology so transferred to India shall only be carried

out in a facility which has been notified by India to the IAEA as per the provisions

of INFCIRC/754. Any nuclear material that may be separated thereby may be

stored and utilised in facilities which have been so notified by India and which are

subject to IAEA safeguards.


2. Enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred to

India pursuant to this Agreement, as well as uranium and all successive generations

of nuclear material recovered or obtained as by-products used in or produced

through the use of equipment so transferred, may only be carried out in a facility

which has been notified by India to the IAEA as per the provisions of



Peaceful uses and Safeguards

1. The Parties shall ensure that the nuclear material, non-nuclear material,

equipment, components or technology transferred under this Agreement, as well as

all successive generations of nuclear material recovered or obtained as by-products,

are used only for peaceful purposes.

2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or nuclear

facilities transferred to India under this Agreement and notified by the supplier

Party to that end, and also all successive generations of nuclear material recovered

or obtained as by-products, shall remain subject to IAEA safeguards, in accordance

with the provisions of INFCIRC/754 as supplemented by an Additional Protocol

(done at Vienna on 25 February 2009, and entered into force on 25 July 2014).

3. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or nuclear

facilities transferred to the United Kingdom under this Agreement and notified by

the supplier Party to that end, and also all successive generations of nuclear

material recovered or obtained as by-products, shall be subject to the provisions of

Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty and of INFCIRC/263, as supplemented by an

Additional Protocol (done at Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force

on 30 April 2004).

4. If the IAEA decides that the application of safeguards by the IAEA is not

possible, the Parties shall consult and agree in writing on appropriate verification measures.



Extent of Application of the Agreement

1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or

technology, as well as all successive generations of nuclear material recovered or

obtained as by-products, shall remain subject to this Agreement until:

Physical Protection

1. Each Party shall ensure that adequate physical protection measures are

applied to nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or

technology transferred under this Agreement, as well as all successive generations

of nuclear material recovered or obtained as by-products. The responsibility of a

Party for ensuring the application of such physical protection measures extends to

the international transport thereof, until that responsibility is properly transferred to

another State.

2. In addition to its obligations under the Convention on the Physical Protection

of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 3 March 1980 and as amended and in force

for each Party from time to time, each Party shall apply the recommendations of

Agency document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 entitled, “Nuclear Security

Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear

Facilities”, as updated from time to time, or any subsequent document replacing

INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Any alteration to or replacement of document

INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 shall have effect under this Agreement only when the Parties

have informed each other in writing that they accept such alteration or replacement.




1. Each Party shall take all necessary measures, consistent with its respective

legislation as well as applicable international Treaties and Conventions to which

both India and the United Kingdom are Party, to prevent the unauthorised use or

disclosure of any information or technology transferred under this Agreement.

Information and technology transferred under this Agreement shall not be

communicated to third parties, whether public or private, without prior written

approval from the Party providing that information and technology.

2. This Agreement is not intended to transfer any intellectual property rights.

The intellectual property rights existing or arising in the framework of the cooperation

provided by this Agreement shall be allocated or transferred, if at all, on

a case-by-case basis in any specific agreements or contracts associated with this



Implementation of this Agreement

1. The Parties, through their respective appropriate governmental authorities,

shall establish administrative arrangements as necessary to facilitate the effective

implementation of this Agreement. Such arrangements shall include the

procedures necessary for the appropriate governmental authorities to implement

and administer the provisions of this Agreement.

2. None of the provisions of this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the

rights and obligations which result from the participation by either of the Parties in

their international Agreements, Treaties and Conventions.



1. The Parties shall consult regularly, or at any time at the request of either

Party, in order to ensure the effective fulfilment of the obligations of this

Agreement, or to review any matters relating to cooperation in the peaceful uses of

nuclear energy. Such consultations may also take the form of an exchange of




Settlement of Disputes

1. The Parties shall promptly seek to settle any dispute concerning the

interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement through

negotiations, or any other means mutually agreed between the Parties.

2. Disputes regarding the interpretation, implementation or performance of

subsequent commercial contracts or Memoranda of Understanding shall be dealt

with in accordance with the provisions found in the contracts or Memoranda of




1. The terms of this Agreement may be amended at any time by written

agreement between the Parties. Such amendment shall enter into force on the last

date on which the Parties have notified each other in writing that their respective

internal procedures necessary for its entry into force have been completed.


Entry into Force and Duration

1. This Agreement shall come into force on the last date upon which the Parties

notify each other in writing of the completion of their internal procedures necessary

for the entry into force of this Agreement.

2. Subject to Article XVI, this Agreement shall remain in force for a minimum

period of forty years (40). If neither Party has notified the other Party of its

intention to terminate the Agreement at least six (6) months prior to the expiry of

that minimum forty-year period, this Agreement shall continue in force for

additional periods of twenty (20) years each unless, at least six (6) months before

the expiration of any such additional period, a Party notifies the other Party of its

intention to terminate this Agreement.

India’s continued use of nuclear-armed missiles (following  the bad  example of the UK, US, China, Russia, and France) has led to a fierce reaction by China to India’s recent missile tests.

 As Brig. (retd) Dr Arun Sahgal,  Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group, a policy think tank focusing on national security, diplomacy and Track II Dialogues, recently stressed: “Two back-to-back Agni IV and V missile tests have rattled China, particularly as they signal the growing prowess of India’s inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development program. Reacting to the Indian missile tests, Global Times, an English-language Chinese state-owned publication, gratuitously advised “India to cool its missile fever. It went on to chastise India for attempting to develop an intercontinental missile capability, adding that owning a few missiles does not mean India has become a nuclear power. “It will be a long time before it [India] can show off its strength to the world.”

The underlying reason for the Chinese outburst is India’s attempt at seeking strategic equivalence with China through its intercontinental missile development program, which can pose a threat to China as well as upset the existing strategic balance in Asia, Dr Sahgal concluded.

(“Why India’s ICBM Tests Rile China”, The Diplomat, (Tokyo) 14 January  2017;

India could face a diverse array of challenges over the next five years, ranging from “internal tensions over inequality and religion” and extreme weather events to the traditional threat from Pakistan-based terrorists, according to a new report by top US intelligence analysts.

And all this could happen as India and the US “grow closer than ever in their history”, says the report titled Global Trends: Paradox of Progress from the National Intelligence Council, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

It described India’s ability to use its economic and human potential to drive regional trade and development as South Asia’s “greatest hope”.

Pakistan, the report said, will feel “compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means” and also seek to “enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing ‘battlefield nuclear weapons’ and sea-based options”.

The possible deployment of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would “increasingly nuclearise the Indian Ocean during the next two decades”. The presence of multiple nuclear powers with “uncertain doctrine for managing at sea incidents between nuclear-armed vessels increases the risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation”, the report said.

“Internal tension to terror threats, US report says India faces many challenges, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 11 January  2017;

As  my annex below outlines, there is opposition from well educated professionals and academics in India to this nuclear expansion. It is a pity Boris Johnson Is not listening to them, but  only to  the vested interests of the nuclear lobby.


Modi-initiative Nuclear  Free SAARC, circulated by Professor Dhirendra Sharma


 The Campaign for South Asian Democratic Union  have  urged  Heads of South Asian states to forgo the path of  Nuclear confrontation. Endorsed by artists, scientists, intellectuals, jurists and   human rights activists of South Asian community, “We accept the Challenge posed by the grim elements of narrow sub-national and sectarian forces, within and without the South Asian borders. The Life and Liberties of future generations are at stake here in the heightened communal trust-deficit when the main problems of Development and Survival are common concern of all peoples in South Asia.


Since 1985, while the Heads of SAARC were meeting annually, India and Pakistan have secretly amassed some 200 Nuclear Warheads avowedly in ‘Self-defence’.  But the Nuclear weapons in “Self-defence” is an irrational political paradigmFor, the Nuclear weapons do not differentiate  between  friends and foes. There is no “self-defense”  in a nuclear conflict, when  movable and  immovable -  homes, schools, hospitals,  temples, mosques, and churches, factories and offices, stationary vehicles and  metros and air-ports–all and everything would be engulfed in the  nuclear holocaust.”


 It is, therefore, imperative that   the SAARC states give up fighting for exclusive regional, sub-national, sectarian or religious identities.  Though divided we are, we need to begin with assertion that the South Asian peoples share not only geo-graphical space but also a common history and culture. History teaches us not to repeat the past mistakes.


India is committed to No First Use of Nuclear weapons doctrine. But  it had   planned the Credible Nuclear Deterrent policy (CNDP).  It constructed nuclear shelters equipped with nuclear warheads on long range surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems. In   February 2014, Nuclear Powered Submarine, named “Arihant”, in Sanskrit,  meaning “the Killer of the Enemy”,   was  launched.


Operating on enriched uranium reactor fuel,  the Arihant   can stay deep inside the Ocean, 300 mt. (980 feet), undetected for months.  Built at the cost Rs. 15,000 crores ( US. $3.9 billion),  the  Arihant sub.  is 110 mt. long, weighs 6000 tones, with the missile range 400 mts. and it  can house 100 personnel, with  all essential  facilities inside the  nuclear submarine. There are four more Arihant N- submarines  under planning.


Indian  have also developed BrahMos  supersonic cruise missiles. The  BrahMos  and Arihant retaliatory system and the underground N-missiles may deter a constitutional state authority. But any non-state actor or Islamic terrorists would not be deterred by our invincible supersonic BrahMos or Arihant  hidden under the deep ocean.  


No First Use doctrine.


The Indian Credible Nuclear Deterrent policy is really  non-credible in response to the  Divine Warrior ( jihadi  terrorist). Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) had constructed twelve prototypes underground nuclear shelters, that are self-contained units with sleeping bunks for 30 top personnel, equipped with captive power and water supply systems. Toilets and decontamination module including waste disposal and fire-fighting systems installed within the nuclear missile base. These radiation-proof shelters are meant to protect a few specialized n-force personnel but for a short-term survival, provided no enemy missile hit the N-shelter directly.

But In case there is a surprise nuclear terrorist attack,  the command ready to retaliate with overwhelming nuclear strikes, leading to total devastation of towns and cities of the enemy. But in a suicidal strike, the land based N-High Command’s electronic system would be destroyed instantly.  How would the N-sub operators know when and against whom to fire the retaliatory Nuclear  missiles.


Dr. Narayan Lakhsman, (in The Hindu, March 29, 2016).   rightly refers to  three N-security potential threats  from the Islamic  State actors  making, acquiring and exploding n-devices.  Admittedly, the Credible N-deterrence is meant to deter any hostile entity from using a nuclear weapon against the Indian Republic. But in case of non-state suicidal jihadi delivered a N-devise, say, on the Parliament.  How the  No First  N-Use policy would work against the terrorist  whose identity  would not be verified.



Stockpiles of Radioactivity


By 1985, both Moscow and Washington had stockpiled 50,000 nuclear warheads and achieved Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) capability to destroy the planet Earth ten times over. In building the Credible N-deterrence India had  repeated  the folly of the Cold War pundits who believed   the Atomic bombs were “ the currency of power”.


No civil defense and fire control mechanism can function in a nuclear war theatre. The concerned scientists have, therefore, established the Nuclear Nights and Nuclear Winter paradigm  that “ the  nuclear war cannot be fought, nor can it be won.”


Dr. Lakshman has also stated that  those who make  the most destructive arsenal in human history are not allowed to speak about their scientific achievements.  Secrecy not only undermines our Democratic Constitution, but also make our scientists suffer high stress often leading to undisclosed  suicidal killing.


 Moreover, the nuclear shelters are but non-active entities in the long drawn nuclear war games.  The Arihant, e.g,  is operated on the enriched uranium fuel. In case of any leak or mishaps, inside the submarine, when it is under the deep ocean,  how would the Nuclear High Command  assure the “safe keeping” of the nuclear subs-with N-warheads. 



Disciple of Atal  Bihari Vajpayee, our dynamic  Prime Minister Modi  is committed to World Peace. The PM of India has  proclaimed repeatedly:

  “The World is One Family” (Vasudhaiv kutumbakam).


Campaign for South Asian Democratic Union call upon  Modi and Sharif  to accept  the United Nations Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.   


Memorandum Signatories include:

Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, Former Attorney General of India/U.N. Human Rights Commission.

Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer.  Former Chief Justice of India.

Mr. Fali S. Airman,  MP.,  President-Emeritus, Bar Association of India; Co-Chair of the IBA Human Rights Institute (2001 to 2004); Founder and Chairman of Permanent Committee of Human Rights of LAWASIA (1979 to 1985).

Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid, Former Chief Justice, Panjab& Sindh, Karachi, Pakistan.

Dr. Sima Samar, Former Minister and Women’s Human Rights Commission,  Afghanistan.

Mr. I. A. Rehman, Human  Rights and Peace Activist, Lahore.

Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Prof. Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

Dr. N. Vittal, Former Vigilance Commissioner of India, Chennai.

(Lord) Prof. Meghnad Desai, Author, of “Rediscovery of India”. 

“Mandela of Kashmir” Mr. Shabir Ahmed Shah, President, J&K Freedom Party, Srinagar.

Dr. S.K. Joshi, Former DG, Council Science & Industrial Research, New Delhi.

Air Vice-Marshal Dr.N.Natarajan(retd.), Ex.Vice-Chancellor, Srinagar University, (Garhwal).

Ms. Saeeda Diep, Chair, Institute Peace and Secular Studies, Lahore.

Prof. M. Shamsur Rahman, Ex.Vice-Chancellor, Jatiya Kabi Nazrul Islam University,Decca.

Dr. Farooq Tariq, General secretary,  Awami Workers Party, Karachi, (Pakistan).

Mr. Haroon Habib, Writer, Journalists, and Bangladesh Liberation War Veteran, Decca.

Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar, Former Editor, Times of India, Member J&K Human Rights Commission.

Prof. B.D. Joshi, Former VC. Kumaon University, Director, Doon Library & Research, Dehradun.

Dr Asghar Ali Engineer, Director, Centre for Islamic Studies, Mumbai (Dr. Engineer endorsed the Campaign a week before he passed away).

Prof. Girijesh Pant, International Studies, JNU, & Ex. VC Doon University.

Dr. K.S. Jayaraman, Former Science Editor PTI, and Resident Ed., NATURE, Bangalore.

“Padmabhushan” Mr.Leeladhar Jagudi, Poet,& Member of the Sahitya Academy.

Mr. Ram Puniyani, Writer and Social Activist, Mumbai.

Dr. Rafat Jamal Azmi, Himalayan Geological Research Scientist, Dehradun.

Ms. Nageen Tanvir, Director, Tanvir Theatre, Bhopal.

Ms Teesta Sitalwad,  Civil Rights Advocate,  Mumbai.

Mr. Bader Sayeed, Lawyer, & Former Chairperson, Minorities Commission, State Wakf Board Tamil Nadu.

Mr.Mohammad Shafi Pandit, IAS (Retd.) former Chairman, J&K Public Service Commission.  Srinagar (J&K).

Dr. Zaheer Ahmad Sayeed, Professor Neurological Sciences, Chennai.

Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed, Prof.of Humanities & Social Sciences, Lahore,

Inst. Of  South Asian Studies, Nat. University of Singapore,

Author, “The Punjab Bloodied,Partitioned & Cleansed”(Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2012). 

Prof. A. H. Nayyar, Physicist, Ex. Quaid-i-Azam University, Islambad.

Dr. Karamat Ali, Convenor, SAARC Peoples’ Conference, Member Labour Rights Commission, Karachi.

Dr. Irfan Engineer, Director, Inst. Of Study of Society& Secularism, Mumbai

Ms. Shabana Azami, Peace activist, Member of Indian Parliament,Mumbai.

Mr. Javed Akhtar, Peace activist, Writer&  Poet, Mumbai.

Ms. Asma Jahangir, Human Rights Activist Advocate, Lahore.

Dr.Nishchal N.Pandey, Director, Centre for South Asian Studies,Kathmandu ( Nepal).

Dr. S.Kalyanaraman,  Former. Sr. Executive., Asian Development Bank.

Prof. S.D. Muni, South Asian Diplomat and author “Emerging Dimension of SAARC”,  Defence Studies & Analysis, New Delhi.